This article investigates perceptions of the extent to which NGO peer regulation initiatives have been effective in enhancing accountability in the humanitarian sector. It is based upon semi-structured interviews with individuals with responsibility for accountability policy from leading NGOs and focuses on two of the best-known initiatives: Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and Sphere. It finds that the initiatives have prompted positive changes in practice, but there are significant concerns about their deleterious impacts. Participants describe a host of challenges, including the tendency of peer -regulation to become excessively bureaucratic and labor-intensive. They cast some doubt on the potential of the initiatives to assist NGOs to be more accountable to affected communities.
Accountability has become the leitmotif of debate about principles of good practice for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It was once relatively easy for NGOs to escape scrutiny of their actions by sheltering behind the flattering caricature of being a 'magic bullet' for a host of societal ills (Edwards and Hulme, 1996) . The push for enhanced accountability emerged in the wake of the Cold War, when Northern governments and international organizations increasingly turned to NGOs to provide emergency assistance in the Balkans and global South. These donors demanded greater financial transparency from NGOs and evidence that programs met their intended objectives (Crack, 2013a) . The sector has also recently been rocked by a series of high-profile scandals, and unsympathetic media coverage (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001) . A legacy of botched relief operations, from Rwanda to Haiti, has evoked concerns that NGOs could worsen the plight of vulnerable people who they aim to assist (The Lancet, 2010) . NGOs are exposed as never before to allegations of corruption, incompetence and abuse of power.
There is widespread agreement amongst practitioners, donors and academics that NGOs should strive to provide assurance that they are 'accountable' actors (Groves & Hinton, 2004; Jordan & van Tujl, 2007 , Kilby, 2006 . It is commonly asserted that NGOs have multiple (and often conflicting) accountability relationships. These include 'upwards accountability' to governments and donors, 'downwards accountability' to affected communities and partners, 'internal accountability' to staff, and 'peer accountability' to the wider sector (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Najam, 1996; Ebrahim, 2003; Crack, 2013b) . Peer regulation initiatives i are the most significant collective attempt to promote these ideals. Peerregulation is the process whereby a sector level organization promotes common standards of quality and accountability for NGOs. NGOs may volunteer to adhere to these standards, but they are not under any legal obligation. Peer-regulation ranges from aspirational codes of conduct, to certification initiatives with robust verification procedures (Lloyd & Casas, 2005) . Lloyd et al (2010) have identified over 350 peer regulation initiatives, which spans a range of NGO activities, such as service delivery, advocacy and fundraising. They were first established, and are most developed, in humanitarian work. This research focuses on the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and Sphere -two of the best-known initiatives for humanitarian NGOs that focus strongly on downwards accountability, and represent both ends of the regulatory spectrum.
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Literature on the topic is scarce. There are some useful practitioner-oriented publications on peer-regulation, but not specific comparisons of HAP and Sphere (ibid; Hammand & Morton, 2011; Featherstone, 2013) . There has been some journal articles on the effectiveness of national and regional peer-regulation, but again, these do not focus on the sector-wide initiatives (Bies, 2010; Gugerty, 2008; Sidel, 2010) . Some practitioners who were closely involved with early discussions about Sphere have published their reflections, but these are now rather outdated since they relate to earlier versions of the project (Darcy, 2004; Dufour et al, 2004; Gostelow, 1999; Tong, 2004) . Most scholarly activity clusters around the reasons behind the emergence of peer-regulation, which can be crudely characterized as a debate between sociological institutionalists/constructivists (Kennedy, 2012; Deloffre, 2010 ) and adherents of principal-agent theory (e.g. Prakash and Gugerty, 2010) . There is barely any academic literature that evaluates the impact of HAP and Sphere policies. This is regrettable,
given that representatives of HAP and Sphere have admitted that there is scant evidence of their impact in improving humanitarian assistance (ALNAP, 2012) . This article aims to address that gap. It investigates perceptions of the extent to which HAP and Sphere have been effective in enhancing levels of accountability across the sector. It is based upon semistructured interviews with thirty-four individuals with responsibility for accountability policy from fourteen leading international humanitarian NGOs. Despite indications that these agents can be important policy entrepreneurs within NGOs and the wider sector, they have rarely been the subject of academic research.
ii The article consists of four main sections. First, there is an outline of the main features of HAP and Sphere, and details of the methodology. Second, there is discussion of the perceived benefits of peer-regulation, which include providing an impetus for change and a signal of credibility to donors. Third, the numerous challenges of peer-regulation are examined, which are as follows: there has been an overwhelming proliferation of initiatives, observance of the standards can be excessively bureaucratic, the initiatives may not adequately accommodate the organizational diversity in the sector, and the extent to which the standards are sufficient to embed a culture of accountability to affected populations is doubtful. Finally, the conclusion offers some policy prescriptions, reflects on the strengths and limitations of the research, and provides recommendations for further research.
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THE SPHERE PROJECT
Sphere is undoubtedly the best-known regulatory initiative: the standards 'have now entered into the lexicon of the aid community and the production of those standards has now entered into its folklore' (Walker & Purdin, 2004: 100) . Sphere proclaims it is 'working for a world in which the right of all people affected by disasters to re-establish their lives and livelihoods is recognized and acted upon in ways that respect their voice and promote their dignity and security ' (Sphere, 2011) ..It was launched in 1997 by the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and a consortium of NGOs as an attempt to develop a code of conduct supported by technical guidance (Walker & Purdin, 2004: 101) . In the initial stages, a working group was established to create a Charter to codify norms about humanitarian action.
The Humanitarian Charter emphasized the centrality of the humanitarian imperative, and declared the fundamental rights of crisis-affected people to receive assistance and to live a life with dignity. It stressed the importance of accountability to affected communities, and their participation in consultations about the provision of assistance. Several committees were tasked with drafting Minimum Standards for emergency response: information about practical action in relief programs that could help to achieve the normative goals outlined in Handbook', containing information about best practice in emergency response, and was widely disseminated throughout the humanitarian community. The Handbook has since undergone two revisions based on exhaustive consultations with thousands of practitioners and hundreds of agencies. The 2011 printed edition stands at nearly 400 pages. It has sold tens of thousands of copies across the world, has been translated into 23 languages, and can also be accessed for free online.
iii Thus, there are firm grounds for Sphere to claim that it 'enjoys broad acceptance by the humanitarian sector as a whole ' (Sphere, 2011: 5) .
The Minimum Standards cover four areas of humanitarian assistance: water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items;
and health action. The Standards are supported by lists of key indicators and guidance notes. (Dufour et al, 2004; Terry, 2002) . They questioned the wisdom of determining common standards for humanitarian operations, since crises occur in hugely diverse cultural, economic and environmental contexts. Moreover, they feared that donors would use Sphere as a tool to impose more restrictive conditions on NGOs, designed to improve cost-efficiency rather than respond to the most compelling human needs (ibid). Two key figures in the development of Sphere have admitted that it has been sometimes 'hijacked and mugged' by donors, and that it can 'grossly fail to support the victims of war and disaster' if it is narrowly interpreted as a set of technical guidelines (Walker & Purdin, 2004: 111) . Nonetheless, they also point out that the 'rights-based approach' promoted by Sphere has been a significant influence on the conception and practice of humanitarian action since its inception (ibid: 110).
HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PARTNERSHIP INTERNATIONAL (HAP)
HAP is one of the few certification schemes in the humanitarian sector, with international reach. It is a multi-agency initiative that aims to enhance the quality of humanitarian programs and the accountability of member organizations to crisis-affected populations.
Accountability is defined as: 'the means through which power is used responsibly. It is a process of taking into account the views of, and being held accountable by, different would be helpful to place the comment into context (e.g. 'a staffer from a HAP-certified NGO stated that…'). All such references have been approved by the relevant interviewee.
The interview data was coded by hand. What follows is a summary of the key themes, divided into two main sections: the benefits afforded by peer-regulation, and the associated challenges. Most of the commentary relates to the latter, which reflects the disproportionate focus of most of the interviewees' responses.
PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF PEER-REGULATION
Catalyst for change HAP and Sphere were forged by an extensive consultative process, which has helped to bestow legitimacy on the initiatives. They represent the distillation of a rich body of expertise in humanitarianism. There was almost unanimous agreement that one of the greatest benefits of peer-regulation is that it generates intra-organizational momentum for change. Participants find the initiatives extremely valuable in raising the profile of accountability issues amongst their fellow staff-members. The wide recognition of the initiatives helps to validate their efforts to promote new ways of conceiving accountability. Further, the participants found that
Sphere or HAP were particularly effective levers for reform once their organization had pledged to abide by the standards. A rhetorical commitment to the initiatives helps to energize discussions about how they can be translated from abstract principles to operational reality. It helps to shape perceptions of the level of service that affected communities are entitled to expect and can instigate meaningful changes in practice. All of the NGOs had internal accountability frameworks that had been shaped to some extent by norms associated with peer-regulation, which attests to the success of the initiatives in setting the policy agenda. Indeed, several participants identified concrete examples of reform that could be directly attributed to the influence of HAP and/or Sphere; including Oxfam's establishment of complaints mechanisms and an open information policy, and Merlin's introduction of a protection policy for vulnerable individuals. There was consensus that one of the most valuable benefits of peer-regulation are the diverse learning opportunities; including training workshops, tools for policy gap analysis, case study materials, discussion forums and informal networking. Both HAP and Sphere were applauded in this respect, and one interviewee observed in terms of the former: 'the conversations that I've had with a number of people whose organizations have been involved in the certification process, the certification aspect of HAP is for a lot of people…secondary to the kind of identification and sharing of good practice that HAP has done' (Int.5). The remark alludes to an undercurrent of cynicism about certification, which is discussed in more detail below.
Signal of credibility
Participants admitted that one of the main motivations for observing peer regulation initiatives is to enhance donor confidence that funds will be spent wisely. Moreover, NGOs are more likely to become involved when peer organizations proclaim adherence to the initiatives, for fear that otherwise they would be in a disadvantageous position in the competition for funds. Both HAP and Sphere promise reputational advantages to NGOs, but participants conceded that HAP is the most highly regarded because of its stringent requirements for certification. HAP's endorsement is seen as one of the most powerful signals of an organization's credibility both within and outside the sector. The terms 'brand recognition' and 'kite-mark' were used by some participants to describe the attractions of HAP membership, which suggests that NGOs have emulated the corporate sector in advertising their accountability credentials, as the following quote reveals:
'HAP also comes with a bit of a PR slant to it, so it enables us…to sell ourselves….That brand bit is actually massively influential, I think, and I certainly know from [our standard-setting' (Int.2). Participants complained of being overwhelmed with trying to meet the reporting requirements and keep abreast of the latest developments; and several described a wearying feeling that: 'there always seems to be a new initiative popping up ' (Int.20 ). An interviewee from Oxfam explained that field-workers 'feel that there are too many of these initiatives -that's feedback that we get quite often, and they're saying, well should we be doing HAP, should we be doing this, should we be doing that' (Int.4).
It is hard to promote the accountability agenda in a climate where practitioners feel inundated with standards and guidelines, since they may become disengaged, and inclined to dismiss attempts at organizational reform as 'just another new initiative, rather than an integral part to what they should already be doing' (Int.7). The risk is that peer-regulation is perceived as a confusing and burdensome policy fad. A former board-member of Sphere recognized that these reactions were commonplace and understandable given that: 'they'd be lucky to get a half-hour briefing on quality and accountability generally before being sent out to the field…they are beyond saturation point in terms of standards and principles and commitments and frameworks' (Int.31). The delivery of comprehensive training programs is logistically challenging when emergencies require rapid deployment to the field, and it is also a resourceintensive proposition given increasingly mobile workforces.
The scope of different regulatory initiatives can overlap, which exacerbates the confusion. Sphere] and there is no clear answer to this' (HAP, 2008: 12) . The accountability requirements relating to both initiatives also overlap with other peer regulation schemes, which means that basic information about performance and impact is often recycled to fit various reporting formats. Moreover, donors frequently tie their funding streams to accountability benchmarks of their own design, meaning that information has to be mined from peer regulation reports rephrased to meet the donor's preferred format. This duplication of effort was roundly criticized by interviewees as inefficient and wasteful.
Participants suggested that accountability priorities of NGOs tend to be biased towards donors, rather than affected populations. This can be directly detrimental to the ability of Lowrie, also identified the financial dependence of NGOs on powerful stakeholders as a fundamental problem. Reflecting on his extensive professional experience, he argued that that donor influence poses severe limitations on the potential to deliver radical reform: 'the only way to redress the power imbalance is to change the business model, to change the political economy. So I would argue that NGOs, being independent organizations, could probably reinvest the money from quality and accountability initiatives into acquiring independent funding without strings…because without that, they can't respond to local influence.'
Bureaucratic overload
The combined pressures of donor accountability and peer-regulation place significant demands on human resources. Nearly all of the participants expressed fears that staff attention, which could be spent on endeavors that could arguably contribute more meaningfully to accountability, is instead spent on the time-consuming task of documenting performance. They did not object to formal reporting procedures per se; rather, they were concerned that excessively bureaucratic procedures limit the extent to which accountability
Reversing the Telescope (Journal of International Development, 2014) 13 mechanisms can assist the organization in developing meaningful relationships with affected communities. In a highly-pressurized and resource-constrained environment, onerous reporting procedures can be regarded as a maddeningly tedious ritual; in the words of another interviewee, 'just another thing to fill in' (Int.2). These qualms were most often linked to HAP, with its strong focus on compliance and verification. The challenge, explained by a participant from a HAP-certified organization, is striking an appropriate balance: 'I know we have to do reporting and we've got the auditors coming in and we've got all these other things, but for me I want to make sure…that the priority is actually delivering the work rather than just reporting on it' (Int.28). Likewise, an Oxfam staffer cautioned that: '…it does risk turning into a paper trail auditing exercise and the actual principles of listening to the people you're seeking to serve can get a little bit lost' (Int.26).
The drain on staff time may not be immediately apparent. Although there was consensus that peer-regulation provided valuable opportunities for networking and sharing of best practice, several suggested that opportunity costs should be factored into the amount of time that has to be spent serving on working groups, attending meetings and developing learning resources.
Given that peer-regulation can be a labor-intensive commitment, several of the interviewees '…because of their huge size and scale, the assurance over maintaining that certification must be an absolute nightmare for them, I don't know how they do it…And speaking to the likes of [three leading federal NGOs] who have that kind of family of organizations, I know that one of the things that they struggle with is… agreeing across all of them to have a global approach is really lengthy and difficult. And obviously there are politics between the family members as well, and it gets very complicated, so in some ways I'm quite pleased that I work for a single-entity organization, it's much easier…it's actually quite an easy organization to influence' (Int.21).
It is relatively simpler for NGOs with a centralized system of governance to collate information about accountability performance for reports to donors and to peer regulators, because they have greater organizational cohesion. Participants who had past experience with centralized organizations, and who were currently employed by federal NGOs, also confirmed that they had previously found it easier to focus the minds of their colleagues on policy changes, and to implement accountability consistently.
Participants from NGOs that work exclusively through partners remarked that HAP benchmarks were not always appropriately tailored to their needs, as illustrated by the following excerpt: 'HAP was expecting us to work with all of our partners on accountability and training all of our partners. But we have about 500 and this is just not going to be possible…we've said, no, that's never going to happen…in some respects I think the approach is more suited for operational agencies rather than those that work through partners' (Int.28). HAP has been useful in promoting a vision of accountability from the standpoint of affected communities, but the reality is that NGOs 'cannot force a partner to work that way' In sum, the management challenges faced by organizations in the sector are very diverse, and there is a feeling that peer regulation initiatives should be flexible enough to accommodate this organizational complexity. The participants believe that it is vital to explain to donors that expectations about accountability should be tailored according to what is feasible for NGOs to deliver.
Embedding a culture of accountability
Interviewees that were supportive of certification schemes doubted whether a profound cultural shift in accountability could be achieved if peer regulation initiatives symbolized nothing more than a paper commitment. HAP's bid for legitimacy largely rests upon monitoring the activities of its member organizations and imposing penalties for noncompliance. It was widely acknowledged that donors were inclined to consider HAP as a credible signal of an organization's integrity because of its robust verification procedures.
Some interviewees with experience of HAP believed the potential of increasing the organization's attractiveness to donors helped to motivate staff to take the accountability agenda seriously. Some related how the pressures of collating evidence of good practice in time for an audit had galvanized people into speeding up a process of reform that may have otherwise stagnated.
However, most participants had misgivings about HAP's compliance-based model, which could risk fostering a technocratic, 'tick-box' mentality towards accountability. These views were expressed by participants with and without direct experience of HAP certification. They suggested that it can raise anxiety amongst practitioners about the documentation of impact and performance, and dilute attention from the lived realities of affected populations. An example is HAP's promotion of feedback procedures, such as complaints boxes and noticeboards, which enable communities to voice their dissatisfaction about the poor performance of NGOs. Although hailed by some as a watershed in NGO accountability, a skeptical participant noted that such mechanisms can be used in an instrumental manner in the context of an accountability culture excessively focused on reports:
'I believe that you can be accountable without having a complaints mechanism -and if you have a complaints mechanism, it doesn't mean that you're accountable. But because we can measure whether we have a complaints mechanism or not, because we can employ staff to run the complaints mechanism, because we can quantify it in large proposals -we do it' (Int.30).
The danger of HAP's model of accountability, founded on routine verification, is that it may have the unintended consequence of tempting its members to pursue tokenistic policies that can be portrayed in written reports as examples of good practice.
Furthermore, there was some hostility towards the implicit threat of sanctions (such as the withdrawal of certification for non-compliance), which was seen as deleterious to efforts to foster a culture of openness. In the words of one participant: 'I think the danger with that is that you'll talk up your work and you won't be honest about the things that actually go wrong' (Int.22). Another participant admitted that learning was undermined across the sector because 'we're kind of terrified of fuelling bad publicity which will directly affect our income' (Int.6). Beris Gwynne, Director for Global Accountability at World Vision, agreed that: 'donors, whether they are private or government, have very little tolerance for being told that somebody has made a mistake.' The potential loss of certification, and the adverse attention that such a penalty would be likely to attract, could be a powerful disincentive to disclosure. Transparency, however, is essential to organizational learning, and improvement in performance is unlikely to be achieved if organizations feel inhibited from discussing their shortcomings. A staffer identified this issue as one of the most frustrating aspects of the job:
'I want more bad news stories, because agencies never share when they're getting stuff wrong' (Int.28).
Nearly all of the participants argued that peer-regulation was not sufficient to inculcate higher standards of accountability. There needs to be a fundamental attitudinal shift at all levels of the organization regarding the nature of their responsibilities towards the people that they seek to represent and serve. According to a senior figure at Oxfam: 'The problem is we're stuffed full of people who want to do good, and because they want to do good assume that '…a cursory comment, a chat to someone who puts themselves forward and perhaps a local person invited to a meeting and that's often seen as accountability. So many organizations talk the talk about accountability and including local people in decisions that affect them.
But in Haiti local people were not part of the decision-making process despite all the talk.
Much of this comes down to individual and organizational attitudes not to the agreed principles and standards that they are signed up to. These attitudes, sometime probably from organizations certified by HAP -result in the agreed principles and standards about local accountability and inclusion being thrown out of the window when it comes down to the new high-profile, high-intensity emergencies. Because it's not ingrained, it's not part and parcel of the culture, it's not part of the psyche.'
Some participants described a certain air of arrogance that persists in some parts of the humanitarian sector; an attitude of 'we know best' and a sense of impatience at having to perform the ritual of community consultation when the best or most feasible way to deliver programs seems obvious. A participant argued: 'it's certainly not conscious, it certainly not a conscious effort to exert power over the poorest in the world. It's just a cascade of wellintentions' (Int.30).
Peer regulation initiatives can be thought of as a weathervane that indicates the changing direction of debate in the sector about accountability norms. The debate will remain relatively superficial until the norms permeate the organizational culture, become embedded in daily practice and are fully absorbed by those that manage and deliver humanitarian aid. Staff should therefore be encouraged to reflect upon their motivations for engaging in humanitarian work, and the nature of the relationships that they forge with partners and communities..
Most participants stressed the importance of strong leadership on accountability from a senior level. Equally, they acknowledged that field-staff should attach real value to efforts to involve communities at each stage of the design, implementation and evaluation of humanitarian assistance. A former chair of Sphere had modest expectations about the potential of peer regulation initiatives to promote such a profound transformation:
'I have come to the conclusion that accountability to beneficiaries can't become, and mustn't become, a hard bureaucratic requirement. Because then you lose the essence and the meaning and the humanity that is about accountability to beneficiaries….I think it needs individuals to make it happen. And individuals will make it happen when they realize that it's fundamentally important, from a rights, from a human dignity, from a humanity perspective.' (Int.31)
CONCLUSION
This research has yielded some candid insights from key informants into the various impacts of peer-regulation on humanitarian action. Several broad themes are apparent from the interview data. It is evident that participants value the contribution of HAP and Sphere in setting a common agenda on accountability, and providing momentum for change. The initiatives have helped to diffuse norms about the rights of affected populations to live a life with dignity, and to be consulted about the provision of assistance. Peer-regulation has strengthened networks between NGOs and facilitated the sharing of organizational learning.
Participants also acknowledged that the initiatives can help assure donors of the integrity of their organizations. HAP membership is a particularly useful tool to showcase the accountability credentials of a NGO.
The benefits of peer-regulation are counterbalanced by a rather daunting list of challenges.
There are serious concerns about the workload that the initiatives can entail, particularly in the context of donors that insist upon receiving separate reports tailored for their purposes.
Several participants were alarmed about the increasing bureaucratization of HAP, and felt that an excessively technocratic approach to accountability could be counterproductive to the broader mission of being responsive to affected communities. Further, participants complained that standards should not be expected to apply equally to organizations with radically different structures and working practices. NGOs face complex challenges in promoting accountability, depending on whether they are centralized organizations, have a federal structure, and/or work with partners. It was suggested that HAP's verification and compliance criteria are rather too rigid to accommodate this organizational diversity. Finally, participants reflected that deep-rooted cultural change is necessary across the sector before the vision of humanitarian accountability promoted by HAP and Sphere can become reality.  HAP standards should be interpreted and applied in a more flexible way; customized for organizations that grapple with complex challenges in coordinating accountability policy. Nonetheless, it is HAP's role to push reluctant organizations to achieve better standards of performance. The plea of mitigating circumstances by some NGOs may disguise institutional inertia and hostility towards change. It would be helpful for representatives from counterpart NGOs to assess one another's performance as part of the review process, in order to filter out genuine difficulties from complaints borne out of recalcitrance.
 There is no panacea for radical attitudinal shifts towards accountability. Cultural changes take time. The trajectory to meaningful reform can be maintained by organizations if individuals are recruited who can demonstrate an appreciation of a rights-based approach to accountability.
The main limitation of this research is the small sample of participants. Expert perceptions may not accord with the views of field-workers and affected communities. It is noteworthy that the findings mainly focus on the management and administrative challenges of peerregulation, rather than the lived experiences of affected populations. This is not to suggest that the insights of the participants are less valuable than those 'on the ground', or to deny that management difficulties can ripple out to the field. It is simply to observe that the participants' assessments of the extent to which HAP and Sphere have proved 'effective' are molded by their situatedness in the elite tier of the organization. Moreover, the participants were able to say little about the experiences of small NGOs. There is evidence to suggest that
